The reform core of state-owned enterprises is to develop mixed-ownership's economy effectively, therefore there are so many large-and medium-sized state-owned enterprises using a variety of resources, adopting various ways to realize mixed-ownership reforms, enriching the theories of mixed-ownership reform, and creating a large number of practical samples. Wuliangye Company, as a very famous making liquor company in China, has issued a large of new stocks to excellent dealers, administrative staffs, and outstanding employees, so that the company can draw into massive private capital in 2016, so Wuliangye Company have made the first step about mixed-ownership reform among Chinese state-owned enterprises. Through comparing the quantity of monetary capital and asset-liability ratio of Wuliangye Company before and after directional issuing new stocks, the distrust about only adding money and welfare tool for relative benefit people can be eliminated. Moreover, the affection of directional issuing new stocks can promote Wuliangye Company dealers and employees to hold shareholdings, and optimize ownership structure. Wuliangye Company has got the exploration for optimizing equity structure to solid foundation for speeding up stated-owned enterprises reform paces, also providing some useful experiences of other mixed-ownership reform, and the ways and patterns are worthy of learning and studying.
therefore employee ownership plan appeared in the 1960s. Currently in developed capitalist countries, most corporate enterprises have implemented such plan supported by related preferential tax policy, due to social development differences, western countries in the world have a few mixed ownership enterprises and studies on such enterprises. The few published articles (Mattijs, Carney, & Gedajlovic, 2001; Hart, 2003) think that private enterprise shareholding generates better performances than state-owned enterprise shareholding.
In China, since the equity division reform of 2006 incorporated private placement into a legal scope, lots of Chinese scholars have conducted related researches and fruitful results have been generated. For example , Zhu Hongjun, He Xianjie, and Chen Xinyuan (2008) put forward that private placement discount was based on agent effect. Wang Maochao and Gan Shengdao (2009) deemed that listed companies had the motive of reducing profits for management earnings in the first year after private placement. Zhang Weidong (2010) had conducted empirical research on the A-share companies directionally issuing stocks on the Chinese capital market. He thank private placement could attain announcement effect in short-term and that the announcement effect taken by listing of a whole group through issuing stocks to controlling shareholders or related enterprises was better than that taken by other types of private offering. In the view of Zhang Weidong and Li Haichuan (2010) , private placement, management earnings, high discount rate, and regulating asset evaluation price had become major means of benefit transfer to controlling shareholders. Zhao Zi (2011) discovered from empirical study on operating performance of private placement that the long-term performance of definite direction issuing was positive while that of public offering was negative. That suggests companies had better long-term performance after definite direction issuing than after public offering. Li Jiaojiao (2016) discovered from empirical study on the non-listed assets of the parent company and related subsidiaries of the listed company directionally issuing stocks that controlling shareholders and associated shareholders had the motive of packaging assets through regulating assets evaluation appreciation rate especially in underdeveloped districts.
Employee stock ownership is belong to one type of private placement; it is a long-term performance incentive plan that motivates employees by making them hold the company's stocks and share options. Employee Implementing Employee Ownership Plan issued by CSRC gave systematic regulations on employee ownership from the state system level for the first time and took employee ownership as an investment system). There is always a heated debate about the mixed-ownership reform and employee ownership of state-owned enterprises between theoretical researchers and practical managers currently. Zhang Yinping (2014) put forward that employee ownership could form decentralized and balanced equity structure as well as a situation of tripartite confrontation among state-owned shares, private shares, and employee-owned shares, which was one of the keys to state-owned enterprise reform. Ma Chunguang (2015) thought enterprises of different ownership properties should be fitted with different employee stock ownership plans. And state-owned enterprises, as leaders of national entity economy, should get actively engaged in mixed-ownership reform and accumulate more experience of Chinese-style mixed-ownership reform. Liu Junsheng (2015) had conducted in-depth studies into employee ownership proportion and withdrawal mechanism among other issues, putting forward the principles should be "employee ownership, but not whole-staff, not average" and designing employee ownership price, dividend rate, and withdrawal mechanism. Wang Ye and Zhou Zheng (2017) put forward that China's employee ownership could be divided into direct ownership by employee and ownership by staff stock holding board.
Despite inevitable deficiencies of both models, they have played a positive role in the mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises.
In conclusion, opinions are divided among academic researchers about the effect of directional issuing new stock and employee ownership on the mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises. In the view of the authors, further analysis is necessary about whether directional issuing new stock may dilute the stock rights of controlling shareholders of state-owned enterprises and whether employee ownership is only a welfare tool. This paper tries to use the case of Wuliangye Listed Company to prove directional issuing new stock cannot only optimize ownership structure, but also can promote ownership of employees and dealers so as to motivate their operation initiative.
Effect of Mixed-Ownership Reform
Mixed-ownership reform is a sally port of state-owned enterprises reform. The government proposes deepening this reform, which makes it become a focus of the theory research and a difficulty in practice. This reform has altogether four routes: overall listing, co-ownership of private enterprises, state-owned enterprise merger and acquisition, and employee ownership. The means of non-public capital into state-owned enterprises include equity capital increase, share right replacement, contribution in terms of shares, debt restructuring, non-currency transaction, share acquisition, debt transferred into equity, subscription transferred into debt, 
Schedule of Private Placement
On July 29, 2015, Wuliangye Listed Company announced a declare, "Considering the uncertainty of related matters, the company halts stock trading starting from 13:00, July 29, 2015. The resumption time remains to be confirmed". On October 30, the company published a proposal of non-public stock issuing, giving specific regulations about issuing target, quantity, price, means, pricing standard, and lockup expiration.
On December 3, 2016, Wuliangye published a notice about adjusting the proposal for non-public stock issuing from issuing quantity, target and means, and investing trend of fund-raising. On December 15, the company announced its application for non-public stock issuing had been approved by CSRC International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and it was waiting for the official approval letter of CSRC. On May 16, 2017, Wuliangye claimed its application for non-public stock issuing had been approved by CSRC and would finish the related matters within six months. By then, the company's proposal for private placement was finalized. On the same day, the company published a notice about adjusting the price and quantity of non-public issued stocks in line with the annual profit distribution plan 2016.
Specific Proposal for Private Placement
According to the proposals published on centers construction, and establishment of service-oriented e-commerce platform. 
Changed Shareholding Ratio of Major Shareholders After Private Placement
The shareholding quantity and ratio of top 10 shareholders before issuing new stocks are listed in Table 2 . So, Yibin State Assets Operation Co., Ltd. is the absolutely controlling shareholder and actual controller.
After the private placement, top company managers, core staff, excellent dealers, and social organizational investors joined the shareholder camp of Wuliangye. The new ownership distribution is shown in Table 3 . After private placement, excellent dealers held 1.12% and employees held 0.61%, totally 1.73%. Although they both appeared in the camp of top 10 shareholders, the ratios were still very low, especially the employees.
Currency Capital and Asset-Liability Ratio Before
Did Wuliangye choose private placement to raise money due to lack of fund? The answer is shown in Table 4 . and 2016, almost all bank deposits, accounting for about 50% or sometimes even 60% of its total assets. The proportion was much higher than the average cash level of the listed companies in the industry; the asset-liability ratio was only 20%. The financial leverage was remarkably low; the net amount of cash flow per share was much higher than average level; as for operating cash flow, it was tight only in 2013 and 2014 affected by the industry and central policy and a trough period of liquor industry. In the other years, the net amount of cash flow per share, each operating cash flow, and operating cash flow ratio were all much higher than ordinary listed companies of the industry (see Figures 4 and 5) . It can be inferred that Wuliangye was not lacking in money, so the company implemented employee and dealer ownership plan not to raise money, but to improve ownership structure. 
Conclusions
Firstly, the purpose of private placement is to optimize ownership structure. Based on the analysis above, Wuliangye Listed Company adopted private placement not to raise money, but to optimize its ownership structure. The reason is Wuliangye had a big sum of unused monetary capital and had no liability with interest like bank loans. Wuliangye, as an old state-owned enterprise with huge institutional framework, faces huge difficulty and resistance in implementing mixed-ownership reform, so this definite direction issuing was just a reform attempt of Wuliangye. And the attempt can offer experience and operation mode for similar enterprises to optimize ownership structure and promote mixed-ownership reform so as to accelerate reform of state-owned enterprises.
Secondly, private placement can be benefited to motivate the operation initiative of employees and dealers.
Wuliangye Listed Company did not involve benefit transfer according to private placement and did not be seen it as a welfare tool for its employees, but a means of enhancing the operation initiative of the employees and dealers.
Wuliangye Listed Company answered CSRC's (China Securities Regulatory Commission) doubt, This non-public issuance is the first step for the company to implement mixed-ownership reform. It is hoped that this measure can fully motivate the initiative of employees, excellent dealers and other strategic investors so as to improve our operation management level and perfect the governance structure.
So, the real purpose is to: form a community of interest through private placement, introducing key employees and excellent dealers into the corporate framework as strategic investors as well as into the company's dividend sharing mechanism so as to enhance the company's performance.
Thirdly, private placement does not affect SASAC's (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administratin Commission) holding to Wuliangye Listed Company. According to the results of the empirical analysis above, after private placement, Yibin State Assets Operation Co., Ltd. directly and indirectly holds over a half of Wuliangye shares, despite a little decrease in proportion, still the absolutely controlling shareholder and actual controller. Although excellent dealers and employees join the camp of top 10 major shareholders, the proportions are quite low, not a blow to the controlling status of SASAC. Besides, it can be learned from the before-after ownership comparison that this private placement does not dilute or damage the benefits of previous shareholders.
